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Relations 
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Abstract 
As a result of the Brexit, China faces both enormous economic challenges and 
political uncertainties in future relations with its largest trading partner, the EU. But 
while the UK’s vote to leave creates an unexpected dilemma for the Chinese 
leadership, whose EU policy focusses largely on gaining vast market access, it also 
presents a rare opportunity for China to harness its policy instruments and diversify its 
initiatives to pursue its economic goals with European partners. As a pre-condition to 
achieving the desired outcome, however, Beijing will need to untangle its foreign 
policy decision-making processes. Against this backdrop, the author will illuminate 
post-Brexit Sino-British relations and reflect on the possible impacts of Brexit upon 
future relations between Beijing and Brussels. A second section will analyse the very 
complex foreign policymaking mechanism in Beijing in terms of its economic policy 
goals with the EU. 
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Policy Implications 
- In the process of developing their bilateral partnership, neither China nor the 
UK will use major infrastructure investments to reconcile the existing political 
and ideological divisions. 
- The EU must enhance its understanding of the aspirations of the Chinese 
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government and the governing capacity of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in order to develop sustainable economic relations.  
- It is crucial but impossible that the EU grant China ‘market economy’ status in 
order to signal political recognition of the CCP. 
- China’s current EU policy is expansive in scope and number of partnerships. 
As a result, some unexpected players have become involved in formulating 
foreign policy, which has produced less desirable outcomes in terms of 
China’s long-term economic development goals and objectives. 
 
The debate over Brexit has made history in international affairs. It is rare for China, 
Japan and the United States to agree with one another on issues of international 
politics. However, all three countries share the view that Britain’s future is in the 
European Union. Notably, President Xi Jinping joined other major world leaders and 
openly voiced the preference that the UK remains in the EU. On 24th June 2016, the 
British vote to leave left the Chinese just as stunned as the rest of the world. 
The Brexit poses a dilemma for Beijing and strikes a heavy blow to the tumbled 
Chinese economy. This move by its newly acquired ‘best partner in the West’ (BBC 
2015b) also imminently challenges Beijing’s foreign policy capability and calls into 
question President Xi’s governing capacity as a steady leader (Yu, 2016b). 
In an era when the Europeans seem incapable of resolving one severe crisis after 
another, Beijing will undoubtedly adjust its bilateral relations with the UK and 
reassess the value of its partnerships with other EU member states and Brussels. With 
respect to the emerging geo-political struggles in Asia, Europe remains disengaged. 
Nor has it shown any interest to get involved in the global power struggles between 
Beijing and Washington. Instead, China is seen almost exclusively in economic terms 
as an opportunity for European service-oriented economies and a threat to jobs in 
European manufacturing sectors. Thus, China’s recent economic turbulences have 
served as a major source of conflict between Beijing and Brussels. 
Despite the multiple ongoing crises in Europe, China’s EU policy still focuses 
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on gaining access to the vast markets there in order to pursue its immediate economic 
activities. Beijing also continues to flex its economic muscles and apply the well-
practiced ‘divide and rule’ strategy in its dealings with EU member states regardless 
of their sizes. In particular, Beijing puts strong emphasis on courting Central and 
Eastern European countries with its ‘16+1’ cooperation framework, which has shown 
significant potential for generating a strong pro-China lobby within the EU.  
However, the European political elites must be aware that Beijing has devised 
several tactics to attain its economic diplomacy goals, which have also become more 
complex as a result of China’s ongoing and much-needed efforts to transform the 
domestic economy. In particular, the ambitious ‘Belt and Road’ initiative1 under the 
aegis of President Xi Jinping is confusing and creates ambiguities rather than 
incentives for EU member states to engage in further collaborations. For instance, 
with a view towards revamping its EU policy agenda, Beijing has intertwined this 
initiative with domestic players, who, however, are little known to the European 
policymakers. This type of change in bureaucratic management will only exacerbate 
the already tenuous EU-China relations.  
 
Post Brexit UK-China relations: crisis and opportunities 
The British vote to exit has indeed diminished Beijing’s hopes to have the UK as a 
strong China advocate in the debate on ‘market economy’ status (EP, 2016). For the 
same reason, the UK has also lost some of its attractiveness as a ‘gateway’ for 
Chinese investors to enter the European market and reach its population of over 500 
million consumers (Yu, 2016a). 
From the perspective of the ancient Chinese philosophical approach, a crisis (wei) 
is synonymous with an opportunity (ji), as reflected in the Chinese term for crisis 
(weiji). Accordingly, a pending Brexit will likely provide Beijing with other windows 
of opportunity to adjust its plans for an economic partnership with London and reflect 
more fundamentally on its foreign policy practices. The stakeholders should not rely 
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on ‘Hinkley Point C’ and its outcome as the sole benchmark to measure the success 
and maturity of post-Brexit UK-China relations (UK Gov, 2016b). 
 
1) The Hinkley Point C deal  
The delayed approval of the Hinkley Point C nuclear project is an immediate 
consequence of changes in the British government after the Brexit referendum. 
However, for Chinese decision-makers, who see it as ‘a test of mutual trust’ in the so-
called ‘Golden Era’ of Sino-Britain relations (BBC, 2015b; Liu, 2016), the project 
overhaul came unexpectedly and generated confusion.  
While an initial frustration is understandable, Beijing should not overreact. 
Hinkley Point C is a unique and intricate project that will demonstrate new ways of 
collaboration among stakeholders in three national governments, the industry sectors, 
trade unions and civil society. Due to its commercial and political complexity and for 
plenty of reasons that have little to do with China, the project remains the subject of 
heated debates. For domestic considerations alone, May’s government was justified in 
seeking a comprehensive review and adding ‘extra strings’ for future infrastructure 
projects on UK soil (UK Gov, 2016a). Beyond that, the deal also involves delicate 
diplomatic relations between the UK and France. Therefore, the new Prime Minister 
has a difficult task to strike the right balance on the Hinkley deal against the 
background of France’s position on the upcoming Brexit negotiation. 
 
2) Chinese investments in a post-Brexit UK 
The wish to forge stronger economic and trade ties with non-EU member states was a 
key argument on the agenda of those who voted to leave the EU. Post Brexit, a robust 
commercial relationship with China is indispensable. Further engaging with China 
economically should therefore feature on the very top of the new government’s ‘to 
do’ list. In return, Beijing should seize the opportunity to negotiate an advantageous 
bilateral trade agreement with London to take effect once the Brexit is completed. 
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The service-oriented economy of the UK will not pose a great challenge for the 
Chinese manufacturing sector. In contrast, the complementarities of the bilateral trade 
ties are positive enough for the two sides to reach a new trade agreement when the 
conditions are right. However, the UK’s successful Brexit negotiation with Brussels is 
a prerequisite for the success of a bilateral free trade agreement. 
Another post-Brexit opportunity for China and Chinese companies is to learn how 
to deal with political risks associated with dramatic shifts in democratic governments 
in a mature free market environment. Mitigating non-market related risks is de rigeur 
for their business strategy planning, if they want to fulfil their ambitions to become 
leading players in world economic affairs. 
The close association and somewhat submissive relationship of Chinese 
companies with the Chinese government has largely impeded their overseas business 
plans. In particular, the Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), such as China 
General Nuclear Group(CGN), China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) and 
China International Investment Corps (CIC), have long favoured investments in major 
infrastructure projects in the UK and worldwide. Their close links with the state are a 
double-edged sword for most Chinese firms, providing support for overseas 
expansion but also hindering growth and profit making in foreign markets, where 
their direct links with Beijing have often provoked suspicions and hostility. 
Chinese SOEs often lack a transparent corporate governance framework and have 
little experience in explaining the purpose of their investments to the British public 
and policy elites. Unlike Western multinational companies, their non-state 
shareholders play only a small role in determining their corporate strategies and 
overseas investments plans. Instead, some party secretaries of the SOEs possess final 
decision-making power with regard to corporate strategies. Given their direct ties to 
the government, it is difficult to judge whether the overseas investments plans of 
Chinese SOEs are politically motivated or based purely on their commercial merit. 
In the mind-set of both the Chinese government and investors regardless their 
ownerships, investing in the UK will ultimately increase their exposure to mature 
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market economies, allowing them to learn sophisticated management skills and create 
long-lasting brand value for their products. These intangible assets are abundant in the 
UK but relatively scarce in China. This is one of the key reasons why the CGN and 
many other Chinese SOEs are enthusiastic to participate in infrastructure projects in 
the UK as a stepping stone to successful global entry into developed economies. In 
addition, those companies that take the opportunities to invest in the UK and 
elsewhere globally will reap the benefits of a competitive advantage over other 
Chinese firms both in the domestic market and abroad. 
 From the UK’s perspective, attracting investments from China is a good way to 
create more employment opportunities at home. In the aftermath of Brexit, the British 
may therefore increase the pressure on the Chinese to fulfil this particular pre-
requisite. If they then do not deliver as promised, they may feel more backlash and 
hostility from both the British political elite and citizenry alike. 
 
3) Post-Brexit: resetting UK-China relations 
On the foreign policy front, the UK’s pending exit from the EU is also an opportunity 
for Beijing to re-assess its own foreign economic policy. Without a doubt, China has 
flexed its muscles to pursue economic statecraft to attain its global political ambitions 
as well as to invigorate its domestic economy. However, this statecraft will probably 
require an update after the Brexit and other associated events. Chinese policymakers 
must be aware that simply shopping around the UK with grand infrastructure projects 
will not automatically generate sufficient financial returns on investments or 
accumulating stronger political capital for crafting its desired global leadership. 
From an economical perspective, Beijing needs to calculate carefully the 
attainable commercial profitability of the planned infrastructure projects and analyse 
the real costs and benefits on an individual basis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
the State-owned banks can offer cheap credit to its SOEs. Financing the already 
committed GBP 6bn (USD 9bn) by CGN to the Hinkley project is a daunting task by 
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itself which involves careful financial due diligence and planning by China’s state-
owned banks and investors (Reuter, 2015). 
On a related political front, both China and the UK are very different in their 
political systems and institutional establishments. Each has different interest groups 
advocating their preferences in the negotiation process of bilateral agreements 
between Beijing and London. It would not be constructive to use investments to 
conceal the key differences of each side over normative issues such as human rights 
and the rule of law. Nor can relying upon infrastructure investments alone eliminate 
existing historical prejudices against one other. 
Instead, what is required is that both China and the UK offer clearer policy 
objectives, better articulate diplomatic efforts, achieve bureaucratic transparency and 
explain what kind of partnership they wish to forge in the aftermath of the Brexit 
referendum. Other areas such as international financial reform, with the UK being a 
founding member of China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), climate 
change and innovation, are crucial for future fruitful collaboration, as it became 
evident during the recent G20 Summit in Hangzhou (G20,2016; UK Gov, 2015). 
 
Post Brexit EU-China relations: old divisions and new challenges 
Beijing’s policy objective vis-à-vis the EU is representative of the fundamental 
characteristics of Chinese foreign policy. China is a country with ‘dual identities’, 
combining a developing country reality with the power ambitions of a great global 
power. Therefore, this particular identity has created ‘issue-oriented national interests, 
which can easily conflict with the type of value-based relationship most preferred by 
the EU’ (Zhang, 2009:123). These dual identities have influenced Beijing’s foreign 
policy, which focus on satisfying immediate economic needs rather than attaining 
long-term strategic goals. Despite the UK’s vote to exit, China’s issue-oriented 
foreign policy agenda will remain unchanged when it engages in the future with an 
independent UK and the EU. 
China and the EU differ fundamentally in their manner of organising international 
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affairs. The EU prefers that international politics be organised under a rule-based 
system, whereas China holds a Hobbesian view on power, which is all about absolute 
sovereignty, stability and control. It is therefore not surprising that Beijing’s current 
EU policy has largely failed to overcome two of its biggest obstacles: obtaining 
market economy status (MES) and lifting the arms embargo. These two issues are as 
much about rules as well as about power. The strains show no sign of abating and 
illustrate that closer bilateral trade ties alone cannot achieve a political strategic 
partnership as both sides had originally hoped for. 
Meanwhile, China’s rising international profile and relentless pursuits in its 
economic statecraft have further complicated its policy towards the EU at both levels 
of policymaking and policy implementation. The Union’s timid response toward 
Beijing’s grand OBOR initiative indicates well this lack of mutual trust and Europe’s 
insufficient understanding of Beijing’s foreign affairs practices. Without reforms and a 
changed mind-set on both sides, such policy-related complexities will continue to 
hamper China’s relations with Brussels and the individual EU member states. 
 
1) Persistent economic tensions between the European Union and China 
For many years, China’s engagements with the EU have largely reflected its rapid 
economic growth as well as its rising international profile on global affairs. Decision 
makers in Beijing are very clear on what China wants from the EU: (1.) free access to 
the European Single Market; (2.) a secure home for its investments in particular a 
willing partner for China’s fast-growing acquisition of overseas assets; and (3.) a 
meaningful diplomatic alternative to its increasingly fractious relationship with the 
US. 
China and the EU have long been at odds with each other over trade and MES issues. 
In particular, the MES has remained a permanent obstacle to further EU-
China  ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ (MFA, 2014). A full market access to 
the EU is vital to sustaining the ‘L’ shape of China’s economic growth, as indicated in 
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Beijing by the so-called ‘authoritative insiders’ at the People’s Daily (People’s Daily, 
2016).  
In Beijing’s view, granting China the MES is not only a statement of political 
recognition by the EU. More importantly, it would bring certain relief to China in 
dealing with its long-standing issue of excessive industrial capacity. In the end, China 
will have to pay a hefty price, both economically and politically, for failing to address 
its industrial overcapacity in time. Laying-off a large number of workers in non-
performing industries will surely be a source of social discontent, which in turn, could 
destabilise the ruling elites of the Chinese Communist Party. 
Yet, the EU still perceives China’s relentless economic pursuits with mixed 
feelings as a further source to undermine the already fragile European economy as 
well as deep suspicion over China’s broader strategic agenda beyond commercial 
calculations. The latest ‘anti-dumping case over Chinese steel imports’ opened by the 
EU Commission has exacerbates the lingering mistrust from both sides (EC, 2016). 
 
2) The continued division over normative values between Beijing and Brussels 
On the political front, part of the EU’s approach to engage with China has remained 
rooted in a democratisation and human rights paradigm, which both the Chinese 
political elites and the public view with great suspicions. The EU-China 2020 
Strategy also stated, ‘China and the EU share positive and common values’ (EEAs, 
2013). However, this ‘commonality’ was a cognitive mistake from both sides as 
Beijing believed that no fundamental conflicts with the EU is equivalent to sharing 
common values. 
The most obvious example of continuing differences in values between Europe 
and China is evident in their perceptions to ‘multilateralism’. Multilateralism, for 
Europeans, is a defining principle of organising world politics and a core element of 
constructing the ‘normative power’ of the EU. Multilateral cooperation should solve 
most transnational problems and even some hard security issues. For China, in 
contrast, multilateralism is ‘a continuation of Realpolitik by other means’ (Holslag, 
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2011:295). In the view of political elites in Beijing, encouraging China’s participation 
in the Western-led multilateral institutions was in fact a trap to contain the rise of 
China. Investing in the West could undermine China’s ambition to reclaim its own 
great power status. Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, it is unwise to use 
multilateralism as a regular mechanism to combat global challenges. These differing 
perceptions of ‘common values’ has caused more frustrations than further 
enhancement of their relations on several occasions.  
For example, in the policy domain of tackling global climate change, the 
fundamental division on multilateralism between Beijing and Brussels was the driving 
force that caused China to oppose the EU’s stance on a global climate regime. 
Chinese officials prefer that climate change and carbon emissions problems should be 
resolved by individual countries according to their different situations, whereas the 
EU contends that environmental issues are transnational in nature and should be 
resolved via binding rules from international organisations. 
Chinese foreign policymakers have a long tradition of equating ‘multilateralism’ 
with ‘multi-polarity’.2 According to their perspective, the world consists of different 
poles under US hegemony. China’s role must therefore be to forge partnerships with 
other poles and challenge the Americans’ supremacy. Given the EU’s rising profile in 
international politics, Chinese foreign policy makers assumed ‘establishing an alliance 
with the EU could undermine US dominance, and was a viable option’ (Wu, 2004).  
 
3) The power of the Chinese Communist Party and EU-China relations 
Apart from their divergent views on multilateralism, China has been in dispute with 
the EU on other normative issues, such as China’s human rights records and China’s 
political reforms. This criticism was driven largely by several constant sources of 
Chinese foreign policy: the power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the 
safeguarding of territorial integrity and national sovereignty. These sources have 
profoundly shaped China’s overall foreign policy and its international identity. 
Needless to say, the same sources have also profoundly influenced Beijing’s EU 
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policy. 
  Surprisingly, the Europeans have largely overlooked the CCP’s powerful role 
and seem to misunderstand its motivating force behind China’s foreign policymaking. 
Any European complacency in seeking to facilitate China’s domestic reform would 
only induce further disputes between Beijing and Brussels. Unlike the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy, whereby democratisation processes through both economic 
and political reforms were seen as effective steps to re-integrate East European 
neighbours, such initiatives are seen in Beijing as posing a fundamental challenge to 
the CCP’s legitimacy, which is based on absolute control of power, societal stability 
and governing capacity. In light of the above mentioned disputes between Beijing and 
Brussels, the EU needs to enhance its own understanding of the aspiration and 
governing capacity of the CCP and the Chinese government. The CCP has an 
omnipresent role in every aspect of policymaking in China and its ultimate aim is to 
retain its power.  
The Europeans cannot afford to ignore the key interests of the CCP or to pretend 
that those conceptual differences on democracy and political freedoms do not exist. 
They should not remain idle under the false assumption that China will soon 
experience a sudden and unexpected political transition from an authoritarian regime 
to a democratically elected government. 
 
4) Bureaucratic politics, Belt and Road Initiative and EU-China relations 
Based on a conventional view from the West, China is a unitary and centralised power 
renowned for its long-term strategic planning and rational foreign policy agenda. 
Under the current Chinese government structure, this picture lost its validity. Almost 
all institutions in the central leadership and local governments are involved in foreign 
relations to different degrees, and it is almost impossible for these ministries and 
agencies to see China’s national interests the same way or to speak with one voice. 
This failure to streamline confuses not only outsiders but also the Chinese people 
themselves. 
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The EU and its member states should also recognise that the scope and contents 
of Chinese foreign policies have expanded enormously since China joined the WTO. 
Certain policy domains, such as climate diplomacy, foreign aid and international 
financial governance, have only recently emerged as policy priorities for the CCP. 
However, since the top leadership does not have enough expertise on its own or 
sufficient time to make the ‘right’ decision on the individual items of its expanded 
foreign policy agenda, those agencies and organisations that already possess strong 
expertise in relevant areas have become prominent and influential by means of 
providing expert advice and policy recommendations.  
Besides traditional foreign policy actors, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the new experts include 
institutions like the People’s Bank of China and the National Reformation and 
Development Commission (NDRC). These experts in the background are either semi-
autonomous or autonomous. They have built up their own centre of gravity in their 
attempts to shape Beijing’s EU policy agenda. On the international stage, they have 
become the de-facto decision-makers on behalf of the Party and the state. However, 
the flow of information derived from them creates a different set of problems for the 
CCP, as most of the new players have no vision of China’s foreign affairs and 
therefore send confusing signals to the outside world. 
 
‘Belt and Road” Initiative and EU-China relations 
In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited several Central Asian 
republics. He reiterated China’s intention of pursuing a policy of large-scale 
investments. He emphasised the revival of the economic and cultural ties that once 
characterised China’s relations with Eurasian countries during the past glory of the 
Silk Road and promoted the recreating the Silk Road Economic Belt in connection 
with the Maritime Silk Road (One Belt, One Road or OBOR). 
This move caused a great deal of confusion for the EU member states and 
Brussels. Beyond the trade statistics and new rail connections, the role of the OBOR 
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initiative is not yet entirely clear for Europe. As an established journalist asserts, 
‘OBOR is longer on sweeping vision than on nuts-and-bolts practicalities’ (De 
Jonquieres, 2015). 
Nevertheless, several EU member states have pledged their support for the 
initiative. Subsequently, in boasts picked up by the media and official papers, they 
spoke of their respective exclusive roles in the OBOR initiative. There was talk of 
German and Polish railway connections, a historical route linking Venice to the 
ancient Silk Road, and even China’s new plan to use the Piraeus port in Greece as the 
European receiving line of the 21st century Maritime Silk Road. But despite these 
reasonable expressions of enthusiasm, the overall European response has remained 
timid. Under the lens of bureaucratic politics, the ambitious initiative under the aegis 
of President Xi Jinping raises the following key questions that Beijing must answer to 
its potential partners: Which departments or ministries shall carry the overall 
responsibilities for OBOR? And what are the selection criteria for categorising 
infrastructure projects as parts of the initiative?  
The bureaucratic opaqueness and overarching policy-related uncertainties of the 
OBOR initiative present a major obstacle in China’s efforts to convince the relevant 
European partners to make a monetary contribution to any infrastructure projects that 
would potentially mobilise their enormous financial resources without providing them 
with an ultimate underwriter to guarantee their investments. 
Therefore, to engage with the EU on the OBOR initiative, China must actively 
promote a unified narrative of its vision and communicate the details of its plan on 
both a political and an entrepreneurial level. Beijing’s lack of a clearly defined set of 
guidelines for the OBOR development suits the Chinese pragmatic approach, which 
allows the Party simply to shift plans during the implementation process whenever 
new opportunities arise. However, this approach generates ambiguities for Europeans, 
who are their targeted partners amongst other continents. Therefore, Beijing’s lack of 
clarity regarding the OBOR initiative jeopardises any potential projects with the EU.  
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Conclusion 
Overall, the UK’s painful divorce from the EU is likely to generate tremendous 
economic and political uncertainties for China, calling the outcomes of Beijing’s 
recent engagement efforts into doubt. There will be plenty of unexpected twists and 
turns in the coming Sino-British relations, similar to China’s experiences with other 
advanced economies in Europe and elsewhere around the globe. A long-lasting and 
healthy diplomatic partnership is not only about the ‘reddest red carpet’ and 
‘investments’ (BBC 2015a); it also requires measured calculations, grounded analyses 
and honest dialogues with one other. Both Beijing and London should ‘Keep Calm 
and Carry On’. 
Regarding the post-Brexit China-EU relations, Europe’s political elite must 
remember that the people in charge of China’s foreign affairs are groomed and trained 
within the system. It is therefore advisable to respect this continuity: the more the 
Europeans do today to engage the Chinese foreign policy elite in constructive debate, 
the greater their chances are for future policies that will reflect European interests. 
The EU needs to devote more resources to understanding China in its ‘dual-identity’ 
and offer a unified, less-value driven approach promoting European excellence in 
knowledge and the Union’s strong mission as a global force for good. 
It is also critical that the EU avoid meddling in China’s internal political reform 
processes. The Europeans must practice restraint in this regard, as a brutal and 
unprepared political transition, like those seen in the Arab Spring, would be a recipe 
for disaster in China. A more turbulent China would not be an easier partner or a more 
benevolent great power than currently under the administration of Xi Jinping. 
Moreover, the EU has a profound interest in a stable and reform-oriented China that is 
economically successful and politically stable. If the Europeans continue to cultivate 
their old habit of advocating the process of democratisation to China, they will further 
alienate their biggest trade partner, which in turn will damage the EU’s already fragile 
economy. 
On the other side, China is in dire need of a sophisticated diplomacy and 
15 
 
 
 
communication strategy in order to keep pace with its own newly acquired global 
power status. It needs new rhetoric that clearly spells out its coordinated foreign 
policy and the way it streamlines proliferations of bureaucratic actors involved in 
policymaking. 
 
Notes 
1. The official Chinese name is ‘Belt and Road’ initiative. The West often refers to it 
alternatively as ‘One Belt and One Road’ (OBOR), the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ or 
the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’. 
2. Author interviews with a senior official at IDCPC, Sep 2012. 
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